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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars have spilled much ink bemoaning the effects of 
various class action opinions rendered by the Roberts Court. They have 
* Counsel, McGuireWoods London LLP. I am grateful to Robert Vaughn for helpful discussions
and to Alexandra Trask, William Trask, and Kathleen Lawton-Trask for their patience and support. 
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argued that the Roberts Court harbors a special affinity for business 
interests1 and a special antipathy to the class action device.2 Many 
publicly worry that the Court is bent on killing the class action.3 (Indeed, 
a number of them are convinced that it has already largely succeeded.)4 
I have argued elsewhere that these jeremiads are wrong: both 
plaintiffs and pro-plaintiff judges are more resilient than the academy 
generally recognizes.5 But, in focusing on high-profile cases like Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,6 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,7 and 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,8 they are also missing the larger story of the 
Roberts Court. The really interesting class action law has not been made 
in these contested 5–4 decisions. Instead, it is a series of 9–0 opinions on 
seemingly smaller issues that add up to a revolutionary change in how 
courts should view the class action. 
Over the last decade, the Roberts Court has established a definitive 
shift away from the entity model of class actions. Largely part of a 
theoretical debate, the entity theory stated that a litigation class is a 
separate juridical entity from its members; whereas its counterpart—the 
joinder theory, or aggregation theory—stated that the class action was 
simply a device to aggregate the claims of a large number of individuals. 
The debate over entity theory is important because it has real 
effects in federal courts. In legal practice, it becomes clear very quickly 
that the rhetorical devices lawyers use have concrete effects. Courts that 
consider a class to be a separate entity rule differently on questions 
before class certification: they allow more discovery for plaintiffs and 
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html?_r=0. 
2. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729,
828 (2013) (“Cases such as Dukes, Concepcion, American Express, Castano, and Hydrogen 
Peroxide do more than adopt new rules. They suggest a suspicion about class actions 
generally . . . .”). 
3. See, e.g., John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, and
Wholesale Change to Class Action Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463, 463 (2013) (“Five decisions by five 
men have fundamentally changed the class action world. . . . And in every case, these changes made 
it less likely that people previously protected by class actions would be protected in the future.”). 
4. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Wal-Mart, AT&T Mobility, and the Decline of the
Deterrent Class Action, 98 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 24, 25 (2012), available at 
www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2012/04/14/Rutherglen.pdf; Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of 
Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
373, 375 (2005); Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, Note, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be 
Televised, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 668-70 (2011). 
5. See Andrew J. Trask, Reactions to Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Litigation Strategy & Legal
Change, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 791 (2013). 
6. Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011).
7. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (U.S. 2011).
8. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S. 2013).
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less for defendants; they are more tolerant of substitution of named 
plaintiffs; they are less likely to consider objections to class settlements; 
and they are less concerned with variations in damages at certification. 
This Article traces the shift away from the entity theory. It begins 
with a discussion of the various academic treatments of the entity model, 
from its first formulation years ago to the more radical “trust device” 
theories advanced today. It then looks at the various ways in which 
implicitly adopting the entity model has affected various rulings in class 
action litigation. Finally, it discusses how the 9–0 opinions in Taylor v. 
Sturgell, Bayer Corp. v. Smith, and Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Knowles (buttressed by Justice Elena Kagan’s dissent in Symczyk v. 
Genesis Health Co.) have made it clear that the Supreme Court favors 
the aggregation model over the entity model. 
II. THE ENTITY THEORY
The entity model posits that a class is not simply an aggregation of the 
absent class members; instead, it is a separate juridical entity with its own 
interests. Those interests are represented by the class counsel and may or may 
not include input from the named plaintiff. The entity exists, in inchoate form, 
from the moment the class action complaint is filed. When the class is certified, 
it confirms the contours of the class and formalizes the representation of the 
named plaintiff and the class counsel. In its “weak” (and therefore less 
controversial) form, the model posits that the entity is formed once the class is 
3
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certified. (This is less controversial because there is little practical difference 
between a “class entity” and a representative joinder action; in both cases, the 
plaintiffs will try a single set of claims through to a verdict, and in both cases, 
that set of claims will be the named plaintiffs’.) The more controversial “strong” 
form of the model assumes that the entity is formed at the time a complaint is 
filed designating the case as a class action. 
There are several implications to using the entity model of the class action. 
First, it de-emphasizes the role of the named plaintiff as a spokesperson for the 
class in favor of class counsel. After all, the named plaintiff is only one class 
member and is not synonymous with the class as an entity. Second, the entity 
model implies that when controversies arise before class certification, they 
should be resolved as if there were a pre-existing class and take the interests of 
that class into account. Finally, the entity model implies that courts should err in 
favor of certification, since that would be best for the entity. (The model also 
implies that courts should look favorably on classwide settlements, regardless of 
the relief they may afford individual class members, since the entity may still 
benefit in some abstract way.) 
A. “Entity Theory” in the Academy 
The description of the entity theory offered above is necessarily 
simplified, but it captures the key points that its various proponents have 
articulated over the years. It is worth a brief recital of the intellectual history of 
the entity theory because its contours have shifted over time, particularly in 
response to previous legal rulings. 
4
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1. The Entity as Client
The first explicit articulation of the entity theory of class actions came 
from University of Michigan Law School professor Edward H. Cooper in 
1996.9 Professor Cooper was primarily concerned with identifying who, 
exactly, is in charge of a class action.10 In traditional litigation, a client brings a 
lawsuit to an attorney, who agrees to represent her. Entrepreneurial attorneys 
are limited by the doctrines of barratry and champerty, which restrict their 
ability to create a claim and then recruit a plaintiff to bring it in a court of law. 
In a class action, however, the lawyers usually “provide the originating 
genius . . . . [T]hey seek out token representatives, pursue the class claim 
primarily for the sake of fees, and measure success by their own fees rather than 
class relief.”11 Professor Cooper noted that courts could not seem to decide 
whether a class action was a traditional lawsuit brought by a flesh-and-blood 
individual or something new brought by a “token, offered up to appease 
memories of a superseded client-adversary model that lingers only in tradition 
and the formal trappings of Rule 23(a).”12 This tension manifests itself in a 
number of ways: defendants will use rhetoric to call attention to it,13 and courts 
will concede it exists while doing little to curtail it.14 
To resolve this dilemma, Professor Cooper argued that class actions 
should be treated as lawsuits brought by an entity (the class) instead of by an 
individual (the named plaintiff).15 According to Professor Cooper, treating the 
entity as the client would focus the court’s attention on whether class counsel 
9. Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
13 (1996). Arguably, then-Professor Diane Wood Hutchinson (now Judge Wood of the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals) set some of the terms for the debate in an earlier article, Class Actions: 
Joinder or Representation Device? 1983 S. CT. REV. 459 (1983). However, the important question 
she posed—whether absent class members were in fact parties who could be subjected to mandatory 
discovery and counterclaims—has largely been resolved. Id. at 482-83; see Heaven v. Trust Co. 
Bank, 118 F.3d 735, 739 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997) (“it is a proper exercise of discretion for the district 
court to evaluate the nature of the counterclaims and the difficulties they present and to consider the 
usefulness of breaking the proposed class into subclasses to avoid those difficulties”); Antoninetti v. 
Chipotle, Inc., No. 06cv2671-BTM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54854, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2011) 
(“Courts do not ordinarily permit discovery from absent class members.”). 
10. Cooper, supra note 9, at 27.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 26.
13. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 266 F.R.D. 98, 104 (D. Md. 2010) (defendant
argued “that the litigation is entirely driven by lawyer-entrepreneurs looking for a fat class action 
payday”). 
14. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 n.9 (3d Cir.1973)
(“Experience teaches that it is counsel for the class representative and not the named parties, who 
direct and manage these actions.”); Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“Realistically, functionally, practically, [counsel] is the class representative, not [the plaintiff].”). 
15. Cooper, supra note 9, at 28.
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(rather than the plaintiff) would provide adequate representation and sharpen 
the court’s understanding of its fiduciary duty to absent class members; it would 
also make it clearer that counsel could not represent individuals pursuing related 
claims as well as the class.16 He also believed that treating the class as an entity 
(instead of an aggregation of individuals) would simplify several controversies 
that, at the time, plagued courts and litigators alike.17 Those included: 
• The application of diversity jurisdiction. At the time that Professor
Cooper was writing, many class actions wound up in state court 
because the claims of the named plaintiff did not exceed the re-
quired amount in controversy. He argued that treating the class as 
a formal entity would allow a federal court to evaluate the defend-
ant’s stake, which would be a more accurate measure of whether 
the case belonged in federal court.18 
• Choice of law. According to Professor Cooper, “it is very difficult
to understand why different people should win or lose, or win 
more or less, because different sources of law are chosen to gov-
ern the self-same conduct.”19 He argued that adopting the entity 
model would lead to “a more rational approach to choice of 
law.”20 He did not, however, clarify how courts would choose law 
for the class entity. 
• The proper scope of preclusion. Professor Cooper was also con-
cerned with the implications of what is now referred to as “claim-
splitting,” where a certified class presents a narrower issue than 
what an individual would bring in a lawsuit.21 He argued that the 
entity model would help clarify the issues that were presented and 
therefore should be precluded in subsequent cases.22 
In short, Professor Cooper was not arguing that a class was in fact a 
separate juridical entity; he was advocating that treating a class as an entity (and 
doing away with the named plaintiff in the process) would be one way of 
resolving a number of disputes about whether to certify a proposed class. 
Professor Cooper did acknowledge that this “entity” view would not fit 
perfectly within established law: in his view, the entity model would work best 
for larger cases involving smaller value claims.23 He also recognized that 
16. Id.
17. Id. at 29-30.
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id. at 29.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 29-30.
22. Id. at 30.
23. Id. at 32.
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treating a litigation class as a distinct entity “might have symbolic 
disadvantages.”24 Most obviously, it would eliminate the agreed fiction that a 
class action was something other than lawyer-driven litigation.25 As Professor 
Cooper noted, pretending that an abstract entity like a “class” is an actual client 
that can govern attorneys would prove extremely difficult.26 As a result, class 
action litigators would likely see heavy resistance from those who disapprove of 
treating lawsuits as products to be manufactured or sold.27 
Many of the issues with which Professor Cooper wrestled have been 
resolved, either by statute, amendment to Rule 23, or subsequent case law. 
Questions about whether class actions qualified for federal jurisdiction, for 
example, were answered in 2005 when Congress enacted the Class Action 
Fairness Act.28 Courts have largely agreed that choice-of-law issues must be 
decided on an individualized basis.29 And various courts have addressed the 
questions about when preclusion was appropriate in subsequent cases.30 
Nonetheless, the argument that a class could (and should) be treated as a 
separate juridical entity captured something in the academic imagination. 
2. The Entity as Litigant
The next articulation of the entity theory came from Professor David 
Shapiro in 199831 Professor Shapiro had participated in two seminal class-
action cases: In re Rhone Poulenc-Rorer, Inc.32 (brought on behalf of 
hemophiliacs who tragically had contracted HIV from contaminated blood 
transfusions) and Castano v. American Tobacco Co.33 (which sought to hold 
tobacco companies liable for knowingly addicting their customers to nicotine). 
In both cases, Professor Shapiro supported the plaintiffs.34 
As he described the entity theory, it meant that the class action should 
be viewed as not involving the claimants as a number of individuals, or 
24. Id. at 31.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). As renowned class action scholar Robert H. Klonoff has noted,
“CAFA has in fact had an enormous impact in shifting most class actions to federal court.” Klonoff, 
supra note 2, at 744. 
29. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1017-
18 (7th Cir. 2002). 
30. See, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999).
31. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 917 (1998). 
32. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
33. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
34. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 913 n.a1.
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even as an “aggregation” of individuals, but rather as an entity in itself 
for the critical purposes of determining the nature of the lawsuit, the 
role of the lawyer and the judge, and the significance of the disposi-
tion.35 
Professor Shapiro focused on the effect the model would have on the 
prosecution of mass tort class actions, which were the primary challenge to 
class action scholars in the mid to late 1990s.36 According to Professor Shapiro, 
the entity model was the “more appropriate” description of how class actions 
should operate.37 He conceded that, if a class was of a certain size, only “certain 
aspects of a dispute” would be “suitable for class treatment”38—a concession 
that undercuts the idea of a pre-existing juridical entity.39 
That said, Professor Shapiro believed that the entity model would help to 
resolve several important controversies involving mass tort class actions. 
Among them: 
• The problem of “immature torts.” One of the questions courts
struggled with at the time was the extent to which a court could 
certify a class action involving a previously-untested tort theory, 
such as the Castano plaintiffs’ “addiction” theory and the Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer plaintiffs’ “serendipity” theory.40 While both ap-
pellate opinions ultimately reversed certification based on the 
plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate compliance with Rule 23(b)(3), 
each spent time discussing the problems posed by allowing a sin-
gle piece of all-or-nothing litigation to test a new theory of liabil-
ity.41 Professor Shapiro argued that viewing the class as an entity 
would reveal the benefits of certifying even novel liability 
claims.42 
• The “right” to notice. Due process requires that the absent class
members be notified of any certified class action that might affect
35. Id. at 917 (emphasis added). 
36. Id. at 920.
37. Id. at 921.
38. Id. at 922.
39. Id.
40. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The gravamen of
[plaintiffs’] complaint is the novel and wholly untested theory that the defendants fraudulently 
failed to inform consumers that nicotine is addictive and manipulated the level of nicotine in 
cigarettes to sustain their addictive nature.”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296 
(7th Cir. 1995) (“Had the defendants not been negligent, the plaintiffs further argue, hemophiliacs 
would have been protected not only against Hepatitis B but also, albeit fortuitously or as the 
plaintiffs put it ‘serendipitously,’ against HIV.”). 
41. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1300-01; Castano, 84 F.3d at 748 (quoting In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer). 
42. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 935.
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them.43 As one might imagine, however, notice costs money, and the 
larger the class, the larger the cost.44 Professor Shapiro argued that 
viewing the class as an entity would facilitate shifting the cost of 
notice to the defendant, which would make class actions more cost-
effective for plaintiffs.45 
• Opt outs. Professor Shapiro also worried that allowing class members
to opt out of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions would undermine the
effectiveness of the device.46
According to Professor Shapiro, the entity model would necessarily 
transform substantive law.47 Specifically, the entity model would make more 
sense when viewed “in light of the goals of effective deterrence and reasonable 
compensation” rather than “in terms either of the traditional view of tort law or 
the aims of the tort system.”48 Professor Shapiro conceded that this view would 
likely violate the Rules Enabling Act49 (which dictates that federal procedural 
rules may not change the substantive rights parties enjoy) and that “using [Rule 
23] to compel movement toward an entity model would be even more
problematic.”50 Nonetheless, he believed that this was the direction in which the 
law was headed51 and that arguing for an entity model would, in the long run, 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more scholars adopted the entity model, 
the clearer it would become how to change the law to enable class litigation that 
did not require named plaintiffs.52 
Like Professor Cooper before him, Professor Shapiro’s version of the 
entity theory has been superseded by subsequent events. The Supreme Court 
disagreed with him that Rule 23 needed modification to accommodate more 
“adventuresome” litigants.53 And, while the Court had always held that the 
plaintiff bore the cost of notice,54 an additional fifteen years of litigation has 
43. See generally BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK §
6.03[2] (2015 ed.). 
44. See generally id. § 6.03[6].
45. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 936-37.
46. Id. at 938.
47. Id. at 941-42.
48. Id. at 931.
49. 28 U.S.C. 2072 (2012).
50. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 953.
51. Id. at 960 (“For some time, we have been moving—both out of necessity and out of a
sense of what is sound policy—toward the idea that the class action device is both important and 
different.”). 
52. Id. at 961 (“If we can accept the notion that in a proper context, the class itself is—or at
least should be—the claimant, and the represented litigant, we will be in a far better position to talk 
about the changes that are needed to realize this goal . . . .”). 
53. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617-18 (1997).
54. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179 (1974) (“the plaintiff must pay for
the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit”); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. 
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demonstrated that notice costs do not appear to deter class action filings.55 
Finally, far from undermining the legitimacy of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, opt 
outs are now accepted as one of the key sources of the device’s legitimacy.56 
Despite these subsequent developments, however, scholars have continued to 
use the entity model, if not as a description of how courts do treat class actions, 
then certainly as a prescription for how courts should treat them, 
3. Scholarly Acceptance of the Entity Theory
After Professor Shapiro’s article, the entity theory of class actions was 
adopted without much objection by a number of prominent class action 
scholars. For example, only a few years later, in arguing that the preclusive 
effect of class actions should be “tailored” to the specific nature of the lawsuit 
(as opposed to claims that could or should have been brought), Professor 
Samuel Issacharoff noted that scholars exhibited “increasing skepticism over 
the view that a class action is simply an unaltered aggregation of individual 
claims.”57 He also felt comfortable asserting that “[c]lasses do take on the form 
of an ‘entity,’ to borrow Professor Shapiro’s term.”58 Professor Issacharoff has 
further clarified his view over time. In a 2013 article, he wrote that “recent 
scholarship has begun to gnaw at the underdeveloped concept of representative 
actions and has instead begun to view the class action as an ‘entity’ once it has 
been certified . . . .”59 To the extent one might treat a class action as an entity 
after certification, there are only subtle differences between the entity model, 
the aggregation model, and the representative model. (Most of these have to do 
with reducing the emphasis on the named plaintiff after certification; some 
v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356 (1978) (“The general rule must be that the representative plaintiff
should perform the tasks [necessary to send class notice], for it is he who seeks to maintain the suit 
as a class action and to represent other members of his class.”). 
55. Furthermore, the Rules Advisory Committee is currently considering proposals to reduce
the cost of notice by employing either email or web publication where appropriate. FEDERAL RULES 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 5 (2014) (“It is now clear that methods 
of notice not imagined in 1974 exist and might significantly facilitate the giving of effective, rapid, 
and much cheaper notice of class certification in 23(b)(3) actions.”). 
56. See Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (U.S. 2011) (“The procedural
protections attending the (b)(3) class – predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to 
opt out – are missing from (b)(2) not because the Rule considers them unnecessary, but because it 
considers them unnecessary to a (b)(2) class.”). This portion of the Court’s opinion was unanimous. 
Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (concurring with Rule 23(b)(2) 
ruling). 
57. Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, & the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002). 
58. Id.
59. Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 704 (2013);
see also Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3165 (2013). 
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might also reduce the emphasis on individual class members.) However, a 
number of scholars have gone further than Professor Issacharoff, arguing that 
one should treat a class action as an entity even before it has been certified. 
In her 2011 article, Professor Alexandra Lahav also divided discussion of 
class actions into “[t]he two dominant schools of thought on the structure of the 
class action[, which] consider it to be either an advanced joinder device, merely 
aggregating individual cases, or a transformative procedural rule that creates an 
entity out of a dispersed population of claimants.”60 According to Professor 
Lahav, the courts could not answer the question of whether to treat a class as a 
separate juridical entity because “[c]lass action doctrine offers little help in 
choosing between the aggregation and entity views.”61 As evidence of the 
persistence of entity theory, she offers the facts that class members cannot 
terminate their counsel and that courts may approve class settlements over the 
objections of some class members.62 (Professor Lahav has backed away from an 
earlier, pre-Roberts Court observation that “some doctrinal developments . . . 
seem to move closer to the entity model.”63) 
She also observes that, despite the courts’ ambivalence about the model, 
“[m]any of the leading scholars of class actions have espoused, either explicitly 
or implicitly, the entity view.”64 Others have also argued for plaintiff—or 
claimant—free class actions, albeit without explicitly invoking the entity model. 
Professor Brian Fitzpatrick, for example, argues that class members should not 
receive damages at all; instead, the benefits should flow solely toward the class 
counsel.65 Similarly, former class action plaintiffs’ lawyer Joshua Davis argues 
that treating class actions as entities for purposes of determining compensation 
would allow courts (and presumably plaintiffs) to sidestep those difficulties that 
arise when not all members of a proposed class have actually been injured.66 
60. Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1941
(2011). 
61. Id. at 1943.
62. Id.
63. Alexandra D. Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L.
REV. 65, 109 (2003). 
64. Lahav, supra note 60, at 1946.
65. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
2043, 2070 (2010) (arguing that class action lawyers should receive 100% of damages awards in 
small-stakes class actions). 
66. Joshua P. Davis, Classwide Recoveries, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 915 (2014)
(“Allowing classwide recoveries . . . would greatly decrease the complexity of the class certification 
decision, and similarly decrease the amount of time and money courts and parties dedicate to the 
issue.”). Professor Davis does discuss the entity model earlier in his article, but claims that most 
class actions exist on a “continuum” between aggregation and entity. Id. at 911. Nonetheless, his 
advocating that courts look only at the possible recovery for the class as a whole is completely 
consistent with the entity model. 
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Most of these scholars have noted that the entity view of the class action 
may require an understanding that the identification or certification of a class 
will change the underlying substantive law.67 
4. The Class Action as Trust
Most recently, two professors on different sides of the class action debate 
have advocated treating class actions as separate litigation entities, specifically 
as beneficial trusts. Professor Sergio Campos has long viewed the class action 
as a “trust device” and argues that treating it as such would enhance the benefits 
of the class action.68 Under his ideal version of the entity theory, there would be 
no named plaintiff at all. Instead, the class action would be operated as a trust 
for the benefit of absent class members, much as bankrupt corporations are 
treated as trusts.69 Class counsel would serve as the trustee.70 
Much like his predecessors, Professor Campos believes that treating the 
class action as a trust entity better reflects the reality of how class actions are 
litigated.71 And, like his predecessors, he also argues that viewing the class 
action as an entity would allow for easier certification of classes and thus not 
allow “defendants to escape some or all of their liability.”72 But Professor 
Campos is also candid that “the trust view of the class action has little to no 
explicit support in the law on federal class actions.”73 
Professor Campos is joined, on the defense-oriented side, by Professor 
Martin Redish (assisted by then-law student Megan Kiernan). Professor Redish 
and Ms. Kiernan also argue that class actions ought to be treated as trusts, but 
their reason for doing so is to enhance preclusion by placing the preclusive 
focus on the attorney (the real party in interest in the lawsuit) rather than on the 
named plaintiff.74 According to Redish and Kiernan, this “guardianship model” 
is an accurate description of the class action in practice and therefore ought to 
receive recognition by the courts.75 As they argue: “Viewing class attorneys as 
67. Lahav, supra note 60, at 1942 (“By contrast, the [Shady Grove] dissent saw this class
action as an entity, a creation that transformed the substantive law.”). 
68. See Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 751 (2012). 
69. Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions & Justiciability, 66 FLA. L. REV. 553, 558 (2014). 
70. Id. at 565.
71. Id. at 570.
72. Campos, supra note 68, at 785.
73. Campos, supra note 69, at 565.
74. See Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The
Relitigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1659, 1662 (2014) (“For all practical purposes, class attorneys function as far more than class 
members’ legal representative. Instead, they act as quasi-guardians or trustees on behalf of the 
absent class members.”). 
75. Id. at 1676.
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profit-driven guardians of absent class members enables the court in the second 
action to accurately view the attorneys who brought the first action as the real 
parties in interest for purposes of direct estoppel on the issue of class 
certifiability.”76 
In general, academic advocates of the entity theory usually seek to 
accomplish one of two goals: (1) prod the law into reflecting the empirical 
reality that the plaintiff does not control the class action lawsuit or (2) make it 
easier to certify a class. It is interesting that, despite the fact that almost no 
courts have quoted these articles and many have rendered explicit rulings that 
contradict the intellectual premises of each formulation of the theory, the entity 
model has proved surprisingly persistent in the academy over the last two 
decades. Moreover, as discussed in greater detail in the next section, while 
courts have not explicitly adopted the entity model, it serves as an implicit 
premise for a number of rulings at various stages of class action litigation. 
B. The Entity Theory in Practice 
The entity theory was far more accepted in the academy than in the courts, 
at least explicitly. However, that does not mean that the courts have ignored the 
theory entirely. 
Instead, much as Professor Lahav observed, courts have implicitly adopted 
the theory at various points. The Rule 23 Subcommittee for the Rules Advisory 
Committee has similarly observed that, prior to the 2003 amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many courts assumed that an uncertified class 
should still be treated as a separate litigation entity.77 These various adoptions 
of the entity theory are most apparent when one looks at pre-certification 
motion practice. If courts exclusively relied on the aggregation model, one 
would expect that before certification, class actions would look largely like 
individual lawsuits, since the model predicts there is no practical difference 
between a class action and an individual lawsuit. On the other hand, if courts 
relied on the entity model, one would expect them to carve out exceptions for 
class actions in early litigation on the grounds that the entity comprised of 
absent class members would require them. 
The real debate over the propriety of the entity theory occurs when one 
looks at what happens (or should happen) to a proposed class either before or 
during certification. Does a class plaintiff (or, more realistically, her lawyer) 
create some kind of juridical entity simply by designating her complaint a class 
76. Id.
77. FEDERAL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 8 (2014)
(referring to “the pre-2003 notion that a proposed class action was to be treated as such until the 
court rejected class certification”). 
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action complaint? Should a class action be treated differently simply because of 
its designation in the pleadings? Does the view of a class as an entity justify a 
less searching inquiry into adequacy or typicality? 
1. Pre-Certification Rulings
a. Rule 68 offers of judgment
Rule 68 offers of judgment are extremely controversial in class action 
litigation. Defendants love them because they have the potential to eliminate or 
at least limit the cost of meritless class actions. Plaintiffs dislike them because 
they allow defendants to “pick off” difficult-to-recruit class representatives. 
Courts are split on whether to entertain motions based on them. 
The most common Rule 68 tactic is to offer judgment to the named 
plaintiff and, when he inevitably refuses the offer, file a motion to dismiss the 
case on the grounds that his claim is moot. The majority of courts have rejected 
this practice, usually on policy grounds. As a result, when allowing the class 
action to continue, these courts often speak in terms that explicitly embrace the 
entity model. 
One of the earliest (and best known) of these cases is Weiss v. Regal 
Collections from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.78 In Weiss, the plaintiff 
had sued the defendant for violating the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA), a statute that provided for specific damages in a class action.79 In 
response, before the plaintiff had a chance to move for certification, the 
defendant made an offer of judgment consisting of the individual statutory 
maximum, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.80 The plaintiff refused. The defendant 
then moved to dismiss the case, a motion the trial court granted.81 The plaintiff 
appealed, and the Third Circuit reversed.82 
The Third Circuit’s opinion was primarily concerned with the policy 
effects of allowing offers of judgment to moot class actions.83 But, in the course 
of reasoning through the various possible outcomes, the court also pointed out 
that “[t]he mootness exception recognizes that, in certain circumstances, to give 
effect to the purposes of Rule 23, it is necessary to conceive of the named 
plaintiff as part of an indivisible class and not merely a single adverse party 
even before the class certification question has been decided.”84 Since the 
78. Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2004). 
79. Id. at 339.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 340.
82. Id. at 339.
83. Id. at 342-44.
84. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
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opinion in Weiss, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have explicitly adopted this 
holding,85 joined by numerous lower courts.86 
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit allows dismissal of class actions where 
there has been a Rule 68 offer so long as there is no certification motion 
pending.87 As the court reasoned, “[t]o allow a case, not certified as a class 
action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in 
federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake defies 
the limits on federal jurisdiction expressed in Article III.”88 The Seventh Circuit 
specifically found that the designation of the case as a class action was not 
enough to merit special treatment. “That the complaint identifies the suit as a 
class action is not enough by itself to keep the case in federal court.”89 In other 
words, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the logic behind the entity 
model in making this ruling. 
b. Discovery.
The question of whether a class is a separate juridical entity also 
influences the question of when (and what kind of) discovery is appropriate. 
For example, class action discovery may include communications with 
absent class members who have similar claims. Under certain circumstances, 
that means the plaintiffs may seek class members’ contact information from the 
defendant.90 In other circumstances, the plaintiffs may seek to limit the 
defendants’ contact with putative class members on the grounds that it would do 
harm to the proposed class. A court that implicitly accepts the entity theory may 
accept the plaintiffs’ argument. A court that views the class action as an 
85. See Diaz v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Corp., 732 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 2013) (“an
unaccepted Rule 68 offer that would fully satisfy a plaintiff’s claim is insufficient to render the 
claim moot”); Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, 639 F.3d 1239, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011) (“the 
federal court’s Article III jurisdiction to hear the motion for class certification is not extinguished by 
the Rule 68 offer of judgment to an individual plaintiff.”). The Eleventh Circuit has also declined to 
allow a dismissal of a class action after a Rule 68 offer of judgment, but did not explicitly adopt 
Weiss’s reasoning. Stein v. Buccaneers LP, 772 F.3d 698, 702 (11th Cir. 2014). 
86. See, e.g., Kensington Phys. Therapy, Inc. v. Jackson Therapy Partners, Inc., 974 F. Supp.
2d 856, 865 (D. Md. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss after offer of judgment); Gregory v. 
Preferred Fin. Solutions, No. 5:11-CV-422(MTT), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30371, at *2 (M.D. Ga. 
Mar. 10, 2014) (strikes offer of judgment on policy grounds; defendant should not be allowed to 
undermine class action device). 
87. Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011). 
88. Id. at 896.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Wellens v. Daiichi Sankyo Inc., No. C-13-00581-WHO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29794, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014) (compelling discovery of contact information for absent 
class members); Kingery v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01353, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33216, 
at *18 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 14, 2014) (requiring Rule 30(b)(6) deponent to testify about absent class 
members because testimony would be relevant to typicality requirement). 
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individual lawsuit until the time of certification is more likely to reject 
unnecessary limitations on communications.91 
The assumptions underlying the entity theory also influence the type of 
discovery the plaintiff may seek from the defendant. In the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, plaintiffs must make a prima facie showing that class discovery is 
worth the effort before it allows for wide-ranging discovery into certification-
related issues.92 (Otherwise, discovery would focus solely on the named 
plaintiff’s claim.) 
The majority of courts in the remaining appellate circuits allow wider-
ranging discovery simply based on the fact that the plaintiff has pled the lawsuit 
as a class action, so long as the discovery is at least nominally related to the 
certification inquiry.93 In doing so, they are implicitly endorsing the view that a 
class action—even before certification—is qualitatively different from an 
individual lawsuit. 
c. Substitution of named plaintiffs
Courts also implicitly rely on the entity theory when they allow the 
complete substitution of named plaintiffs before a class has been certified.94 For 
example, in the food-labeling class action Aguilar v. Boulder Brands, Inc., a 
trial court in the Southern District of California granted a named plaintiff’s 
motion to amend her class complaint to remove herself and substitute in a new 
named plaintiff.95 The defendant objected to the substitution, arguing that once 
the named plaintiff resolved to withdraw from the case, there was no live case 
or controversy before the court.96 The court, however, refused to “focus strictly 
on the temporary void on the plaintiff’s side of the ‘v.’”97 
91. See, e.g., Bobryk v. Durand Glass Mfg. Co., No. 12-cv-536, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145758, at *4 n.1 (D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2013) (denies motion to limit defendant’s communication with 
class members, in part because, since “the Rule 23 class has not been certified, plaintiffs’ counsel 
does not represent the putative class”). 
92. See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985); Heerwagen v. Clear
Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 234 (2d Cir. 2006); Nelson v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. 13-cv-
02276-BLF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123315, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2014) (allowing discovery 
for plaintiffs who showed, pursuant to Mantolete, that discovery could substantiate their class 
allegations). 
93. See, e.g., Kingery, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33216, at *18.
94. There is little debate that substitution is possible after a proper class has been certified,
although the new named plaintiff must demonstrate that she will be an adequate class representative. 
See, e.g., Velasco v. Sogro, Inc., No. 08-C-0244, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104047, at *9 (E.D. Wis. 
Jul. 30, 2014). 
95. Aguilar v. Boulder Brands, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-08162-BTA-BGS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
122822, at *23 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 2, 2014). 
96. Id. at *15.
97. Id. at *18.
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2. Settlement
Courts may also adopt the entity model when evaluating class settlements. 
Class settlements are often reached before a class has been certified in the 
case,98 leading the plaintiffs and defendants to seek certification at the same 
time they ask the court to approve settlement. As a result, some courts will 
reach results about the terms of the settlement, or about questions that arise in 
the settlement process, that are best explained by their adherence to the entity 
model. 
Professor Lahav identified one of these cases in her discussion of Lazy Oil 
Co. v. Witco Corp.99 Lazy Oil involved one of the rare cases where a proposed 
class action was litigated by a sophisticated named plaintiff who conceived of 
the case and brought it to the lawyers.100 After a class had been certified, the 
lawyers entered into negotiations with the defendants and reached an agreement 
for a settlement.101 The named plaintiff’s principal (who, remember, had been 
the driving force behind this litigation) did not approve of the settlement, so he 
formally objected to the agreement and moved to disqualify class counsel.102 
The Lazy Oil court was thus faced with the question: Who really 
represented this class, the named plaintiff or the attorneys?103 The trial court 
decided in favor of the lawyers: it refused to disqualify or remove the class 
attorneys from the case and proceeded to approve the settlement as meeting the 
various tests the Third Circuit required the court to apply.104 
Lazy Oil is a case that concerns a class that had already been certified in 
the litigation, at a time when the named plaintiff and counsel were working 
together and the defendant was their common adversary.105 As a result, the 
division between class representative and class counsel, while not insignificant, 
was easier to reconcile than it might be in other cases. From a doctrinal 
standpoint, if the court has certified a class with a specific definition, bound by 
identified common issues, then it is conceivable that it could find the 
represented group is better served by its lawyers than by its appointed 
representative. 
As more recent case law has shown, however, the lawyer is not always the 
preferable representative. In Eubank v. Pella Corp., the Seventh Circuit (in an 
98. See generally ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 43, § 8.04 (discussing timing and
procedures for class action settlements). 
99. Lahav, supra note 60, at 1945-46 (discussing Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581
(3d Cir. 1999)). 
100.  Lazy Oil, 166 F.3d at 583. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. at 583-84. 
103.  Id. at 588. 
104.  Id. at 589. 
105.  Id. at 584. 
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opinion by Judge Richard Posner) reversed approval of a settlement where 
several of the named plaintiffs had objected and the class attorney had 
responded by replacing them with more compliant representatives.106 
But the truly murky issues arise when one considers class actions that are 
only certified for purposes of settlement. In other words, before the settlement 
agreement, there is no finally defined class with a certified common objective; 
there is only the named plaintiff and the lawyers. As a result, various aspects of 
the proposed class, such as the definition of the class, the claims it has 
advanced, or the relief it seeks, can change based solely on what the class 
counsel—as opposed to any of the putative class members—believe will secure 
a settlement.107 
One also can view cy pres distributions in settlements (that is, 
distributions to charities that would benefit those in a similar position to class 
members) as relying at least partially on the entity theory. To the extent courts 
have authorized cy pres distributions when further compensation to class 
members was possible, they tend to rely on the idea that the class as an entity 
will benefit, regardless of whether identifiable class members do.108 
3. Certification
The entity model also has subtle effects on the certification argument. 
Technically, certification is the process by which a court determines whether 
there should be a class in the first place. As discussed in greater detail above, 
numerous scholars, including Professors Cooper and Shapiro, specifically 
advocated the entity model of the class action because they believed it would 
allow the court to elide difficult questions—such as choice of law—that serve 
as obstacles to certification. 
However, a number of courts certifying class actions have adopted 
reasoning that indicates they believe the class is a pre-existing entity, and 
 106.  Eubank v. Pella Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10332, at *14 (7th Cir. Jun. 2, 2014) 
(noting that counsel “removed the original four class members who had opposed the settlement; 
naturally their replacements joined Saltzman in supporting it”). 
 107.  See, e.g., Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 10-05663, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21441, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011) (Alsup, J.) (standing order warning against expanding class 
for settlement purposes). 
 108.  See, e.g., In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Cy pres 
distributions imperfectly serve that purpose by substituting for that direct compensation an indirect 
benefit that is at best attenuated and at worse illusory.”); Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., Nos. 14-1198, 
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21874, at *17-20 (7th Cir. Nov. 19, 2014) (criticizing proposed cy pres and 
injunctive relief as not benefiting actual class members); see also Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8, 8 
(U.S. 2013) (Roberts, C.J.) (statement accompanying denial of certiorari of class action settlement, 
noting: “The unnamed class members, by contrast, received no damages from the remaining $6.5 
million. Instead, the parties earmarked that sum for a ‘cy pres’ remedy . . . .”). 
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preserving its separate rights often provides a reason for their certification 
rulings. The most prevalent entity-based argument is that individualized 
damages should not serve as a barrier to certification because inquiring into 
individualized damages distracts from the damage done to the class as a 
whole.109 (This is distinct from the argument that individualized damages will 
prove too complicated or unmanageable to justify certification.) 
C. The Entity Theory Contrasted with the Aggregation Theory 
The entity theory is most often contrasted with the “aggregation” or 
“joinder” theory of class actions. The aggregation model states that a class 
action is a form of joinder that allows for representative litigation. In other 
words, instead of joining hundreds of other claims into a lawsuit, a plaintiff 
bringing a class action prosecutes her individual claims. If she meets the 
requirements of Rule 23, then the court certifies her lawsuit as a class action, 
meaning the verdict will bind all members of the class as defined. Individuals 
retain the right to opt out of the class action where they could have received 
individualized relief, a situation usually covered under Rule 23(b)(3).110 
The aggregation model is not without its flaws. For one thing, it relies on 
the legal fiction (undermined by empirical research)111 that the named plaintiff 
actually drives the litigation. In fact, as courts and commentators have both 
recognized, class actions are usually conceived and controlled by 
entrepreneurial attorneys who recruit token representatives.112 
III. THE ROBERTS COURT REVOLUTION
Despite Professor Lahav’s protestations that courts have provided little 
guidance on the viability of the entity theory,113 the Roberts Court, in a series of 
unanimous decisions, has provided a clear answer that excludes the strong 
version of the entity model and seems to embrace the aggregation model. 
 109.  See, e.g., Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, 
J.) (suggesting class relief be distributed to charitable foundation rather than class members); Beck-
Ellman v. Kaz, 283 F.R.D. 558, 569 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying class; finding predominance 
despite variations in damages because “Plaintiff Beck-Ellman seeks no remedy that would require 
an award of damages unique to any particular class member or subclass of class members.”). See 
also Davis, supra note 66, at 917-18 (“In addressing class actions, courts make decisions – often 
implicitly – about whether they will calculate recoveries on an individual or classwide basis.”). 
110.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 111.  See, e.g., Stephen Meili, Collective Justice or Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of 
Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV. 67, 111 (2011). 
112.  See Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Often the class 
representative has a merely nominal stake . . . and the real plaintiff in interest is then the lawyer for 
the class, who may have interests that diverge from those of the class members.”). 
113.  Lahav, supra note 60, at 1943. 
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A. Taylor v. Sturgell 
The Roberts Court laid the foundation for this quiet revolution in Taylor v. 
Sturgell,114 a case that was not even a class action. Taylor involved a dispute 
over whether an individual bringing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit 
could be precluded under the doctrine of “virtual representation.”115 Plaintiff 
Brent Taylor had brought a lawsuit under FOIA seeking records from the 
Federal Aviation Administration.116 Previously, his friend Greg Herrick had 
sought the same records in a similar lawsuit.117 The primary difference between 
the two suits was that Taylor filed in a different jurisdiction (the District of the 
District of Columbia instead of the District of Wyoming) and raised two 
arguments that Herrick had neglected.118 The District of the District of 
Columbia held that Taylor’s lawsuit was barred by claim preclusion because his 
friend Herrick had served as a “virtual representative.”119 The D.C. Circuit 
affirmed.120 
The Supreme Court reversed.121 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg began by restating the general rule that “one is not bound 
by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a 
party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”122 Justice 
Ginsburg did note several exceptions to this general rule: for example, “in 
certain limited circumstances, a party may be bound by a judgment because she 
was adequately represented by someone with the same interests who was a 
party to the suit. Representative suits with preclusive effect on nonparties 
include properly conducted class actions[.]”123 
It is significant that Justice Ginsburg focused on “adequate” 
representation. It is also significant that she specified the class action must be 
“properly conducted.” These emphases line up with the aggregation model for 
class actions, where one of the key questions at certification is whether the 
named plaintiff can adequately represent the class, and where certification is the 
turning point between individual lawsuits and classwide litigation. 
114.  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008). 
115.  Id. at 884. 
116.  Id. at 885. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. at 886. 
119.  Id. at 888. 
120.  Id. at 889. 
121.  Id. at 885. 
122.  Id. at 893. 
123.  Id. at 894 (internal quotations & citations omitted). 
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B. Smith v. Bayer Corp. 
The next case, Smith v. Bayer Corp.,124 answered the question: Does 
denying certification to one proposed class action have any preclusive effect on 
other, identical class actions? 
This was a question of real and compelling importance to both sides of the 
class-action bar. As already discussed in greater detail, the open secret about 
class action practice is that the lawsuits are lawyer-driven rather than client-
driven.125 As a result, defeating class certification in one case often does not 
mean victory in the litigation; class counsel can just re-file the same complaint 
with a different named plaintiff in front of a different judge. As Judge 
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, this 
“[r]elitigation can turn even an unlikely outcome into a reality.”126 Assuming 
enough named plaintiffs, class counsel will eventually find a judge who will 
certify the proposed class.127 
That was exactly the circumstance that faced Bayer Corporation. It 
defended (and defeated certification) against a class action alleging that the 
company had violated various consumer-protection statutes by selling a 
cholesterol drug called Baycol, which allegedly caused rhabdomylosis, a muscle 
disorder that could lead to heart attacks.128 
After this victory, Bayer asked the federal court to issue an injunction 
barring the prosecution of a related class action in a West Virginia state 
court.129 (That case had been filed in state court before the enactment of the 
Class Action Fairness Act’s expansion of diversity jurisdiction130 and so could 
not be removed to federal court.) Bayer argued that the injunction would pass 
muster under the Anti-Injunction Act’s regulation exception131 because the 
certification decision in federal court precluded certification of an identical 
class in state court.132 The trial court issued the injunction.133 And, when the 
state-court plaintiff appealed, the Eighth Circuit upheld the injunction.134 
124.  Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (U.S. 2011). 
 125.  See Culver v. City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (“the real 
plaintiff in interest is the lawyer for the class”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking 
Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 297 (2010) (noting entrepreneurial nature of 
plaintiffs’ lawyers); see also ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 43, § 3.02[1], at 78. 
126.  In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir. 
2003) (Easterbrook, J.). 
127.  Id. at 766-67. 
 128.  Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2373-74. The class action had originated in West Virginia, but 
after removal and transfer to a multi-district litigation (MDL) court, it wound up in the District of 
Minnesota. Id. at 2373. 
129.  Id. at 2374. 
130.  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
131.  Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012). 
132.  Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2374. 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine two issues: “The first 
involves the requirement of preclusion law that a subsequent suit raise the 
‘same issue’ as a previous case. The second concerns the scope of the rule that a 
court’s judgment cannot bind nonparties.”135 In a unanimous opinion authored 
by Justice Kagan, the Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision, holding that 
a federal court cannot enjoin a state court from re-litigating a class action that 
had been denied certification in federal court. In doing so, the Court held that 
the plaintiff was not precluded from asserting his claim because the two cases 
involved some different issues (i.e., the differing standards for certification),136 
and more relevant to the discussion here, because he was not a party to the 
previous action. By the time the second case had been filed, it was clear that 
Smith was not a party to the first case—only former named plaintiff George 
McCollins was. 
In these circumstances, we cannot say that a properly conducted class 
action existed at any time in the litigation. Federal Rule 23 determines 
what is and is not a class action in federal court, where McCollins 
brought his suit. So in the absence of a certification under that Rule, 
the precondition for binding Smith was not met. Neither a proposed 
class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.137 
In fact, however, Justice Kagan’s opinion had gone even further and 
explicitly stated that, until the lawsuit was certified as a class action, it was 
simply an individual lawsuit. 
If we know one thing about the McCollins suit, we know that it was 
not a class action. Indeed, the very ruling that Bayer argues ought to be 
given preclusive effect is the District Court’s decision that a class 
could not properly be certified. So Bayer wants to bind Smith as a 
member of a class action (because it is only as such that a nonparty in 
Smith’s situation can be bound) to a determination that there could not 
be a class action. And if the logic of that position is not immediately 
transparent, here is Bayer’s attempt to clarify: “Until the moment when 
class certification was denied, the McCollins case was a properly con-
ducted class action.” That is true, according to Bayer, because 
McCollins’ interests were aligned with the members of the class he 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. at 2374-75 (internal footnotes omitted). 
136.  Id. at 2375-79. 
137.  Id. at 2380. Richard Freer has argued that this holding is only dicta, since the Court had 
already reversed the Eighth Circuit decision based on the non-mutuality of issues in the litigation. 
Richard D. Freer, Preclusion & the Denial of Class Certification: Avoiding the “Death by a 
Thousand Cuts,” 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 85, 93 (2014). Given its grant of certiorari to decide both 
issues, it is unlikely the Court would agree. 
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proposed and he “acted in a representative capacity when he sought 
class certification.” But wishing does not make it so.138 
The Court did recognize the policy issue raised by its opinion: more than 
other lawsuits, class actions are subject to a “re-litigation” problem.139 For the 
specific case before it, the Court noted that it was unlikely the situation would 
recur because CAFA would now allow the defendant to remove such a case to 
federal court.140 More worrying, however, was the prospect that plaintiffs’ 
counsel might file a subsequent lawsuit in another federal court. The Court 
pointed out that this particular difficulty could be handled by either multidistrict 
consolidation (if the subsequent cases were filed before certification was 
denied) or by asking the new federal court to exercise “principles of comity” 
when evaluating subsequent class actions.141 
The request for comity has, so far, not proven itself an effective solution to 
the problem of re-litigation. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has specifically 
held that, since comity between federal district courts is only discretionary, it 
does not provide grounds for striking class allegations in a copycat class 
action.142 (In other words, the defendant would have to re-litigate the case—
engaging in costly discovery and motions practice—up to at least class 
certification even though it had already defeated certification once in another 
federal court.) Federal district courts have split in such a way that it is difficult 
to tell whether the exercise of comity has proven to be a new doctrinal tool or 
simply a means of enforcing their old inclinations to either let the case proceed 
or stop it in its tracks.143  Regardless, the continuing debate over comity 
reinforces the impact of Justice Kagan’s opinion: until a class action has been 
certified, it has not been “properly conducted,” and cannot bind anyone other 
than the named plaintiff. 
138.  Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2380. 
139.  Id. at 2381-82. 
140.  Id. at 2382. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Smentek v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.). 
143.  Compare Murray v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. C 09-5744, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18082, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) (denying certification of copycat class action; while 
previous denial of certification did not “compel a denial,” it provided “strong guidance”); and Baker 
v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 11 C 6768, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9377, at *14-16 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
24, 2013) (striking class allegations based on “respectful attention” to denial of certification in 
previous case); with Cleary v. Am. Capital, Ltd., No. 13-12652-RGS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25990, at *8-9 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2014) (refusing to strike class allegations based on comity). 
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C. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles 
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles144 was a case that involved 
interpretation of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).145 Congress passed 
CAFA in 2005 to address a number of perceived abuses in class action 
litigation. The most notable of these was jurisdictional: plaintiffs would often 
bring multi-million dollar, nationwide class actions in state court, believing that 
“local” state judges and less developed class-action case law would give 
hometown plaintiffs an edge over corporate defendants.146 CAFA minimized 
that problem by loosening the requirements for federal jurisdiction. Leaving 
aside a few statutory exceptions, it stated that, for a class action, the removing 
party needed to establish only minimal diversity (any one plaintiff hails from a 
different state than any one defendant), rather than complete diversity (no 
plaintiff and defendant share a common state of residence), and would need to 
establish an aggregated amount in controversy of $5 million rather than 
demonstrating that the named plaintiff by herself had placed $75,000 in 
controversy.147 
The passage of CAFA fundamentally changed class action litigation. 
Plaintiffs found themselves in federal court far more frequently.148 As a result, 
plaintiffs began experimenting with new tactics that would allow them to 
remain in state court. Some plaintiffs reduced the scope of their complaints, 
hoping to take advantage of the “local controversy” and “home state” 
exceptions in the statute.149 Others tried to reduce the amount in controversy, 
either by bringing smaller cases or—more relevant to this discussion—by 
disclaiming any damages greater than $5 million.150 
144.  Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (U.S. 2013). 
145.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453(b) (2012). 
146.  Knowles, 133 S. Ct. at 1350; see also John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, 
They’re Making a Federal Case Out of It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (2001) 
(making pre-CAFA case for jurisdictional reform). 
 147.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453(b). One could argue CAFA’s treatment of the class action is 
consistent with the entity model. CAFA directs courts to look at the amount brought into 
controversy by the entire class, rather than just the named plaintiff’s claim. That said, a number of 
courts interpreting CAFA have pointed out that the amount-in-controversy analysis looks at the 
maximum recovery, which would necessarily require the court to assume that the named plaintiff 
would prevail at class certification, as well as assuming that she would prevail at verdict. See, e.g., 
Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 2010) (estimate of total billings was 
appropriate for CAFA amount in controversy). Explicitly making these assumptions for the 
purposes of determining whether the case meets a statutory requirement is still consistent with the 
aggregation model as well. 
 148.  Klonoff, supra note 2, at 744 (“CAFA has in fact had an enormous impact in shifting 
most class actions to federal court.”). 
 149.  See generally ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 43, §4.03[3][b] (discussing tactics 
involving CAFA jurisdiction). 
150.  Id. 
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That was the tactic Greg Knowles and his attorneys used. The Knowles 
case involved allegations that the defendant insurance company had illegally 
failed to reimburse homeowners who had made claims under its policies for 
general contractors’ fees.151 According to the plaintiff, the case involved 
“hundreds, and possibly thousands” of class members.152 To avoid federal 
jurisdiction, the plaintiff stipulated that he would not seek damages of more 
than $5 million on behalf of the class.153 Standard Fire Insurance still removed 
the case, arguing that such a stipulation was not valid.154 A trial court in the 
Western District of Arkansas agreed with the plaintiff: the court found that the 
damages would have amounted to slightly more than $5 million, but with the 
stipulation, the amount in controversy had not been met.155 Standard Fire 
Insurance appealed to the Eighth Circuit, to no avail.156 
The Supreme Court, however, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice 
Stephen Breyer, agreed with the insurance company’s argument. As Justice 
Breyer wrote: 
As applied here, the statute tells the District Court to determine wheth-
er it has jurisdiction by adding up the value of the claim of each person 
who falls within the definition of Knowles’ proposed class and deter-
mine whether the resulting sum exceeds $5 million. If so, there is ju-
risdiction and the court may proceed with the case. The District Court 
in this case found that resulting sum would have exceeded $5 million 
but for the stipulation. And we must decide whether the stipulation 
makes a critical difference. 
In our view, it does not. Our reason is a simple one: Stipulations must 
be binding. . . . The stipulation Knowles proffered to the District Court, 
however, does not speak for those he purports to represent. 
That is because a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot le-
gally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certi-
fied.157 
In other words, until a class is certified, a named plaintiff is merely an 
individual plaintiff. The class has no legal standing before certification, 
therefore class members could not be bound by what the named plaintiff did in 
151.  Knowles, 133 S. Ct. at 1347. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Id. at 1348. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. at 1348-49 (emphasis added). 
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their name. The named plaintiff is not acting on behalf of class members until 
such time as the case has been certified by the court. 
Since the opinion was unanimous, lower courts have largely followed it 
without distinguishing or modifying it in any way.158 (For contrast, one need 
only look at the various ways in which lower courts have both applied and 
distinguished the more controversial Dukes and Behrend opinions.159) 
D. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk 
A final case that illuminates the same principle, but was not decided 
unanimously, is Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk.160 Symczyk addressed 
whether a defendant could use a Rule 68 offer of judgment to moot the claims 
of a plaintiff in a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. (The 
FLSA collective action is a close cousin to the Rule 23 class action, but it is not 
the same device. Most importantly, FLSA collective actions create opt-in 
aggregated litigation, rather than the mandatory or opt-out lawsuits created 
under Rule 23.161) 
As discussed in greater detail above, Rule 68 offers of judgment are a 
common defense tactic for certain class actions. Those courts that decline to 
apply them largely do so on the grounds that allowing the defendant to moot the 
named plaintiff’s claims would somehow compromise the interests of the 
prospective class.162 Indeed, even those courts that do allow Rule 68 offers of 
judgment (like the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit) tend to 
compromise by only allowing an offer of judgment to moot a class action where 
there is no motion for certification pending.163 
In Symczyk, the plaintiff was a nurse who had brought an FLSA collective 
action complaint against her employers, seeking statutory damages for an 
alleged violation of the statute.164 (According to the complaint, the defendant 
had improperly deducted 30-minute breaks from its employees’ shifts.165) When 
 158.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, 748 F.3d 769, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) 
(criticizing the logic of Knowles, but reversing the remand order because “the Court has spoken and 
we are bound”). 
 159.  See, e.g., Trask, supra note 5, at 797-804 (detailing methods courts have employed to 
distinguish Dukes); Glazer v. Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d 838, 859-60 (6th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing 
Behrend after remand from the Supreme Court); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 800 
(7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.) (same). 
160.  Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523 (U.S. 2013). 
 161.  See generally ANDERSON & TRASK, supra note 43, § 3.02[3] (discussing distinctions 
between FLSA collective action and Rule 23 class action). 
162.  See supra notes 78-86. 
163.  Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011). 
164.  Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1527. 
165.  Id. 
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the defendants responded to the complaint, they also made an offer of judgment 
under Rule 68 for the full amount of the plaintiff’s statutory damages, plus 
attorneys’ fees.166 They then moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds 
that the plaintiff’s claim was moot.167 
The plaintiff responded with an entity-theory based argument: that the 
Rule 68 offer of judgment had been an impermissible attempt to “pick off” the 
sole named plaintiff in the collective action.168 The trial court held that the offer 
of judgment had mooted plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the case.169 (It was 
persuaded, in part, by the fact that no other individuals had opted in to 
plaintiff’s lawsuit.170) On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, citing concerns 
that the defendants were attempting to (as the Supreme Court characterized it) 
“short circuit the process.”171 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the mootness question. 
The Court split 5–4, with the conservative Justices (Alito, Kennedy, Roberts, 
Scalia, and Thomas) in the majority and the liberal justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Kagan, and Sotomayor) dissenting. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held that “[i]n the absence of any 
claimant’s opting in [to the proposed collective action], respondent’s suit 
became moot when her individual claim became moot, because she lacked any 
personal interest in representing others in this action.172 Justice Thomas also 
rejected any attempt to use Rule 23 precedent (which had been offered by the 
defendants) to support a wider ruling that might also apply to class actions, 
calling the cases “inapposite” because class actions under Rule 23 were 
“fundamentally different from collective actions under the FLSA.”173 
The “fundamental difference” Justice Thomas cited was that, in FLSA 
collective actions, absent employees only join the litigation by “filing written 
consent with the court.”174 By contrast, under Rule 23, “when a district court 
certifies a class, ‘the class of unnamed persons described in the certification 
acquires a legal status separate from the interest asserted by the named 
plaintiff.’”175 He repeated this point only a few paragraphs later: “a putative 
class acquires an independent legal status once it is certified under Rule 23.”176 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id. 
170.  Id. 
171.  Id. at 1527-28. 
172.  Id. at 1529. 
173.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
174.  Id. at 1530. 
175.  Id. (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975)) (emphasis added). 
176.  Id. (citing Sosna, United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980)) 
(emphasis added). 
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In other words, the Court explicitly identified the moment of certification as the 
moment when a case expands from an individual lawsuit to one that represents 
the interests of the class. 
Of course, this logic would argue for allowing an offer of judgment to 
moot a putative class action. Justice Thomas left the door open for that ruling by 
pointing out that settling a collective action early does not deprive additional 
claimants of any rights to bring lawsuits: “While settlement may have the 
collateral effect of foreclosing unjoined claimants from having their rights 
vindicated in respondent’s suit, such putative plaintiffs remain free to vindicate 
their rights in their own suits.”177 Moreover, he responded to Symczyk’s 
argument that “picking off” a named plaintiff in a collective action would 
frustrate the efficiency justifications for a collective action, as articulated for 
class actions in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper.178 While he rejected 
the argument on its logic, he included a footnote that implied Roper may no 
longer be good law: “Because Roper is distinguishable on the facts, we need not 
consider its continuing validity in light of our subsequent decision in Lewis v. 
Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 110 S. Ct. 1249, 108 L. Ed. 2d 400 
(1990).”179 
But the truly interesting part of Symczyk, as it applies to the entity theory, 
is not Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, but the dissent authored by Justice 
Kagan and joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. If the 
dissenters were concerned about the same policy questions that had animated 
some of the lower courts’ rulings on offers of judgment (that is, that allowing an 
offer of judgment was not in the interest of the putative class), then one would 
expect them to at least mention those concerns. Instead, Justice Kagan’s dissent 
focused entirely on the nature of the plaintiff’s individual FLSA claim. As she 
wrote: 
The Court today resolves an imaginary question, based on a mistake 
the courts below made about this case and others like it. The issue 
here, the majority tells us, is whether a “collective action” brought un-
der the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 “is justiciable when the lone 
plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot.” Embedded within that 
question is a crucial premise: that the individual claim has become 
moot, as the lower courts held and the majority assumes without decid-
ing. But what if that premise is bogus?180 
And, as she continued: 
177.  Id. at 1531. 
178.  Id. at 1532. 
179.  Id. at 1532 n.5. 
180.  Id. at 1532 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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We made clear earlier this Term that “as long as the parties have a 
concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the 
case is not moot.” “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible 
for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing par-
ty.” By those measures, an unaccepted offer of judgment cannot moot 
a case. When a plaintiff rejects such an offer—however good the 
terms—her interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And 
so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief. An unaccepted set-
tlement offer—like any unaccepted contract offer—is a legal nullity, 
with no operative effect. As every first-year law student learns, the re-
cipient’s rejection of an offer “leaves the matter as if no offer had ever 
been made.” Nothing in Rule 68 alters that basic principle; to the con-
trary, that rule specifies that “[a]n unaccepted offer is considered with-
drawn.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 68(b). So assuming the case was live be-
fore—because the plaintiff had a stake and the court could grant 
relief—the litigation carries on, unmooted.181 
In other words, the problem with the majority’s opinion was not that it 
held that the plaintiffs’ assertion of a collective action could not save her 
individual claim from being mooted, it was that her individual claim could not 
be mooted by her rejection of an offer of judgment. The effect of the ruling 
would still eliminate the defense tactic of offering judgment and then moving to 
dismiss a claim, but it would do so without ever looking at whether the claim 
itself was individual or collective. In other words, it did not consider the class to 
be an entity worthy of consideration before certification.182 
Taken together, these four rulings indicate that the entity model—at least 
to the extent that it dictated treating an uncertified class like a litigation entity—
is a dead letter. The Supreme Court has ruled, definitively, unanimously, and on 
multiple occasions, that until the moment a class action is certified under Rule 
23, it is nothing more than an individual lawsuit. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The entity model has enjoyed scholarly support for more than two 
decades, despite the fact that such support has rarely translated into legal 
opinions that adopt its logic. Nonetheless, while courts have not expressly 
 181.  Id. at 1533-34 (internal citations omitted). I have cited this passage at length because it is 
important to how the Roberts Court treats the entity model. In this case, while Justice Thomas had 
overtly challenged the entity-based justifications for not mooting class actions, Justice Kagan’s 
response ignored them entirely. 
 182.  The Eleventh Circuit has since adopted Justice Kagan’s reasoning. Stein v. Buccaneers 
LP, 772 F.3d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 2014). However, it did not ignore the fact that the case was a class 
action; instead it held in dicta that the named plaintiff’s claim could also relate back to the original 
class action complaint should it become moot. Id. at 707. 
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invoked the entity model, it is clear that some courts have ruled in ways that are 
consistent with their assuming the model is either (1) an accurate description of 
a litigation class or (2) is reflected in other legal rulings. 
In the four opinions discussed above, the Supreme Court has definitively 
held that a class action is nothing more than an individual lawsuit until the time 
that a court certifies it as a class action. The implications of these rulings will 
affect pre-certification motion practice, settlement, and even the certification 
debate itself. Of course, trial courts have not necessarily recognized these 
implications yet. And, to the extent these were not the immediate holdings of 
each case, those courts inclined to certify a class may still find ways to slip past 
the logical implications. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has handed academics 
a clearer understanding of the nature of the class action as it is litigated and 
defendants a powerful tool for opposing attempts to read too much into Rule 23. 
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